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Abstract 
Taking as sample, data obtained directly by the pension fund of an Italian 
multinational containing more than 35 thousand members, it is assessed, through 
logistic regression models,  how demographic characteristics might affect individual 
risk aversion. The test is useful to identify groups of workers that by nature are 
more risk averse and could be disadvantaged by the 2006 TFR (severance 
indemnity) Italian pension reform. For example women controlling for age, 
income, region and financial literacy prefer lower risky portfolio and they are more 
likely to switch toward safer sub-funds. 
This analysis could support the policymaker to calibrate a suitable appendix to the 
last TFR reform in order to cover gaps in opportunities among different kind of risk 
takers mitigating the so called “social security risk”. 
In the meantime, it is taken the occasion of such a rich dataset to exploit this 
sizeable shock in order to test forced (or semi-forced) participation, confirming 
higher risk aversion for forced participants. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
Risk preferences are highly heterogeneous. In the whole microeconomics 
literature, it has been particularly important to analyze the shape of the individual 
risk preferences in order to define the utility curve. A lot of studies examined 
factors shaping different risk preferences that are at the base of the investment 
decisions. Some studies highlight a high impact factor: gender. Many others 
examine what variables mostly affect the decision to invest in more risky or less 
risky portfolios.  
Different leading papers have conjectured that women are more risk averse than 
men. But the issue is not so clear as it appears because most of the studies are based 
on a survey approach or an experimental one. In literature can be identified two 
different approaches to measure household attitudes toward risk: 1- the revealed 
preference approach infers risk aversion using weight of risky share contained in 
portfolios chosen by investors. This is the case of this paper, that takes origin from 
Olivares et al (2008) where differences among gender are studied throughout a 
panel data for two different periods and controlling by age, monthly income, 
balance account and region. 2- The other is based on the elicitation of risk 
preferences from direct experiments and answers to survey questionnaires.  
The aim of this paper is to understand the consequences of a sensible public reform, 
such as TFR pension reform in Italy and the effect on certain categories of 
individuals. The Italian reform on TFR (“Trattamento di fine Rapporto”) provoked a 
very important shock in the pension system. In fact, until 2007, a worker received a 
gross wage, from it the employer held a part to pay taxes and his/her consumes, a 
part is taken as contribution for the employee’s pension and a part as contribution 
for an eventually lump sum that the employee will collect from the firm at the end 
of the working relationship. This last contribution is called TFR (Trattamento di 
Fine Rapporto) and was collected in the firm balance sheet until the employee left 
the firm. It is not a redundancy pay-out, since he/she will get it even if he/she 
resigns voluntarily. It is like an “end-of-service pay-out”. The amount of it is about 
the total wage divided by 13.5. So, it is a huge part of the personal income. It 
represented a low cost resource of financing. The firm had to compound it at very 
low rate; according to the Italian Law at 1.5% + (0.75 * inflation rate). At the end of 
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2005, the Italian Government formulated a very revolution in the field of the 
pension system. It established that starting from 1st January 2007 the employee had 
to choose if holding his TFR in the company or to bring it to a chosen pension fund. 
For companies with more than 50 employees, even if the employee decides to leave 
his/her TFR in the firm, the firm is obliged to transfer the contribution to a pension 
fund. Due to the reform  also agents with scarce information about finance had to 
choose about the category of risk fund, a clear example of forced participation. 
According to previous studies, females are more risk adverse. We want to 
effectively prove whether effectively Italian women are more risk adverse than 
men when choosing different retirement plans based on risk preferences. The social 
issue is linked to the fact that since women choose lower risk funds (that in the 
long run should yield less, as in figure 2), earn lower wages (and so make smaller 
monthly TFR contributions)  and work for less years, they will accumulate a lower 
end-of-service pay-out, that moreover it should be used for more years (since 
average life for women is higher than for men). The consequence could be an 
insufficient flow to assure an adequate living standard (also called social security 
risk). 
To analyze the Italian case, I take as sample data obtained directly from the Fopen, 
the pension fund of the Enel Group (and other ex-Enel companies) with 37366 
subjects under analysis. This fund gives the opportunity to each member to choose 
among 6 categories of portfolios (only one till 2003 and only four till 2007). The 
difference among types of funds is the investment limit in stocks. The investment 
limit in stocks in each fund is: 70% for the riskiest (Prevalentemente Azionario),  
50% for the second risky fund (Bilanciato), 30% for the third (Bilanciato 
Obbligazionario), 10% for the fourth (Obbligazionario), 0% for the lowest 
(Monetario e Monetario Classe Garanzia).  To my understanding, no study has been 
undertaken on Italian pension funds focusing on gender variable and fund choice. 
Moreover the dataset is useful not only to extract information about factors 
affecting aversion to risk but also to model the dynamic of the choice. A natural 
shock helped us also to understand the choice for individuals forced to participate. 
Anyway in the period of the analysis (from 2000 to 2012), 2 interesting points of 
time are been used as shocks: 2003 since the pension structure went from 1 risk 
category to 4 categories, then 2007 when an invasive reform has been 
implemented. 
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In the first kind of test, using a Binomial Logit model we find the main factors 
affecting the choice to join the most risky category or the less risky one. Since data 
are standardized, it is easy to interpret the results as score of contribution to opt for 
high risk (less risk aversion) or low risk (more risk aversion) categories. Results 
clearly highlights that gender, age, income, geographical factor and trading really 
affects aversion to risk in line with the previous literature like in Bajtelsmit and 
Vanderheid (1997), Guiso and Paiella (2009) etc. That is, female are more risk 
adverse also controlling for many variables. Huge evidence of factors provoking 
more risk aversion are advanced age and living in less developed geographical areas 
(like South or Islands). While propensity to trading, higher income and living in 
more developed areas are factors affecting risk aversion negatively. Wealth is the 
only ambiguous factor, but it could be due to weak construction of that variable 
(since the observation of such a variable is only partial). Moreover, using the same 
set of data and adding a new dummy variable capturing the date of inscription of 
each individual before or later an established date, it can be inferred that people 
with lower interest in financial matter (or less financial knowledge, or merely 
forced to participate) are more risk adverse even controlling for other factors. 
In the second kind of test we go more deeply to the dynamic of the choice, that is, 
the aim is exploring factors that make the switch toward an higher risk category 
more or less likely. Using as in the previous test a Binomial Logit model I take into 
consideration a very large set of switches during the period from 2003 to 2012. This 
kind of test confirms the first one: women are more likely to change toward a lower 
risk category even controlling for age, income, trading, wealth and geographical 
factors. It appears even clearer if we carry on the analysis only on the sample of 
employees that had to switch in 2003 from the only one available category to one of 
the new 4 categories. 
In a third test, throughout test of hypothesis, as in Olivares et al (2008), we verify 
the existence of differences in the weight of men and women that change their 
portfolios within fund categories. This allows to eliminate the notion that part of 
previous results of the paper are driven by the number of women and men in the 
sample. When controlled by proxy of income and age, the difference not only 
persist but slightly increases. In addition, with the same method, it is demonstrated 
that forced participants (or anyway workers that joined the fund before the reform) 
are more risk adverse.  
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The drawback of the previous literature (using experiments or choices under 
shocks) ridden over by this paper is that: here behaviors are not elicited in 
hypothetical setting but reflect individual risk attitudes in actual financial decision. 
While the main drawback in the revealed preference approach, that this paper is 
able to overcome is about the endogeneity of the variable wealth (and income). 
That is, in previous papers, if an household benefits a pay rise, unless the household 
rebalances its portfolio immediately, its financial wealth increases and its portfolio 
risky share mechanically shrinks. But in the case of this paper, individual chooses a 
fix percentage on his/her income, that implies a constant share of risky assets unless 
he/she changes to another risk category. Under this prospective we do not exclude 
the presence of DRRA1 (decreasing relative risk aversion). But anyway, the aim of 
the paper is to encourage the lawmaker to consider a useful appendix to the 
previous reform, giving the opportunity to disadvantaged agents (by nature) to take 
decision starting from the same risk attitude. Otherwise, the reform stand alone is 
giving the opportunity to freely take advantage of the market only to a determined 
class of agent (the less risk adverse). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will introduce the literature 
review on this topic, where, introducing the main results, drawbacks about 
different kind of studies are examined. In Section 3, the Italian pension system will 
be described in order to introduce the important reform of 2007 taken as a shock; 
moreover, a summary of Fopen history and sample data will be introduced. In 
Section 4, methodology will be discussed in order to show the numerous results. 
Finally in Section 5, I will comment the results in the light of the TFR reform. 
 
                                                           
1
 Risk preferences are highly heterogeneous:  =  Where  is an individual fixed effect 
that captures unobserved risk preferences, 	
 is the effect of wealth due to . 	can assume 
different values:  = −1 in presence of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion preferences 
(CARA);   = 0 means Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA); −1 <  > 0 in case of 
Increasing Relative Risk Aversion and Decreasing AbsoluteRisk Adversion;  > 0 in 
presence of Decreasing Relative Risk Adversion (DRRA) and Absolute Risk Aversion. 
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Section 2. Literature Review 
The literature in this field followed mainly 2 approaches: the first is based on a 
revealed preference2 strategy that infers risk aversion from the portfolio risky share 
chosen by investors in real life. The second relies on the elicitation of risk 
preferences from subject behaviors in experiments and answers to survey 
questionnaires (Guiso and Sodini, 2012).  
This study is focused on highlighting that gender plays a role in the 
individual/household portfolio allocation decision, where women tend to invest in 
portfolios characterized by a lower level of risk (volatility) and clearly they are 
more risk adverse then men. Literature on gender difference in risk aversion is 
further divided into 2 lines. The first focuses on finding if there is actually a gender 
difference in risk aversion. The second one focuses on the psychological factors that 
would result in women being more risk-adverse than men. In my case, what is 
appealing in the study is to investigate if women are more risk-adverse than men 
after controlling for wealth, income, age, trading and regional factors. Moreover, it 
will be interesting to know if other categories of subjects are more sensitive to risk 
aversion. This is important for social implication as Sunden and Surette (1998) 
suggest: gender differences in investment decisions exist, but they are more 
complicated than previous literature have suggested, including also marital status. 
They moreover infer that if women are not making optimal investment choices this 
could severely impact their accumulated wealth for retirement. 
As written before, methods to extrapolate and analyze risk aversion in individual 
investment behavior space from the use of data on actual assets holdings to 
questionnaires soliciting hypothetical portfolio decision. Results varied according to 
the dataset used and due to the control variables used. This is the first paper in the 
household finance literature using large Italian actual data describing the concrete 
choice of individuals in defined contribution plan (also if only for the part 
                                                           
2
 Revealed preferences approach is based on the intuition that  = 


 where  is the 
expected risk premium, 	is the return volatility of risky assets and 	 	the fraction of 
financial wealth invested in risky assets (portfolio risky share) 
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regarding the so-called TFR contribution). Many studies have largely used the 
Federal Reserve’s Survey of consumer Finances3 (SCF), which is a triennial survey 
of the balance sheet, pension, income, and other demographic characteristics of U.S 
families. Sunden and Surette (1998) use data from this survey, as well Jianakoplos 
and Bernasek (1998) that find that single women exhibit relatively more risk 
aversion in financial decision making than single men. They examine household 
holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in 
financial risk taking. As wealth increases, the proportion of wealth held as risky 
assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single 
men. Gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age, race, 
and number of children. Greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation 
for women's lower levels of wealth compared with men's. Also Bajtelsmit, Bernasek 
and Jianakoplos (1999) use this kind of data, noting that in view of the longer life 
expectancy of women, even given the same investment strategy and retirement 
savings as men, consumption in retirement will be less for women. Thus if greater 
risk aversion is evident in retirement saving decisions, women's consumption levels 
could be eroded. 
Other datasets (but regarding Italian individuals), are the UCS survey that is 
conducted on a sample of Italian individual investors owning a checking account at 
Unicredit, a large European banking group and the Italian Survey of Households 
Income and Wealth by Bank of Italy). Respectively used by Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2011) and Guiso and Paiella (2008). The first paper contributed to suggest 
that risk aversion does fluctuate in a major way. Hence, it is possible that 
fluctuations in risk aversion can explain those  movements in asset prices that are 
not justified by changes in expected cash flow. In fact, they document that 
individual risk aversion increases substantially following the 2008 financial crisis. 
This increase cannot be explained on the basis of standard reasons (such as changes 
in wealth, habits, or background risk). The only variables that have any explanatory 
power are proxies for changes in confidence. Moreover, they test that fear can have 
an heavy impact on changing the risk aversion, but they do not test for gender 
differences. While the second paper tests in the reality the hypothesis of CARA 
preferences through a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the 
                                                           
3 The pioneers in using this data in the risk aversion field are Friend and Blume (1975) 
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maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a risky security. They find that 
consumer’s environment (background risk) affects risk aversion more than taste 
and demographic parameters.   
Sometimes the size of the sample analyzed has been dramatically small, like in 
Bernasek and Shwiff (2001), where the sample included only 270 faculty. They find 
that gender is a significant factor explaining the difference in the percentage of an 
individual’s retirement fund invested in stocks, with results conforming to the 
theory, that is, percentage decreases as respondent are women.  
As in Bernasek and Shwiff (2001), interesting studies focused on the importance of 
cultural background as factor to control for gender difference. This kind of studies 
try to verify the so call hypothesis of “expertise dominates gender”. There is some 
evidence that decisions in financial affairs may differ from decisions in abstract 
gambles, possibly because financial decisions involve clear incentives. In detail 
there seem to be two separate forces which reduce the gender difference in risk 
aversion, i.e. familiarity with risk and risk decision under financial framing. A clear 
example of this studies is by Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) that conducted a 
written survey with professional fund managers in the United States, Germany, 
Italy and Thailand between spring 2003 and winter 2004. Testing the “expertise 
dominates gender” hypothesis surprisingly ends in a victory for the gender 
difference. In fact, controlling for a large set of competing influences, the gender 
variables always shows the sign as expected from the earlier literature, that is 
female fund managers keep their more risk adverse behavior but on the other hand 
the effect is comparatively weak for the established risk measure. Moreover, they 
find that the relative economic importance of the gender-related difference in 
explaining behavior is sometimes small in comparison to competing influences, 
indicating that indeed financial expertise decreases the gender difference, but does 
not erase it.  
Instead, in Hibbert, Lawrence and Prakash (2008), measuring gender difference in 
risk aversion using a sample that controls for biases in the level of education and 
financial knowledge, they conclude that when individuals have the same level of 
education irrespective of their knowledge of finance, women are no more risk 
averse than men. They used a dataset resulting of a survey of Finance and English 
faculty at  universities in the US. Since all individuals in their sample have achieved 
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at least a graduate degree, they implicitly control for the level of education. Finally, 
they conclude that gender difference in risk aversion is confined to individuals who 
are married or live with a partner, in fact, single women are no more risk-adverse 
than single men when they are both highly educated. But, analyzing the class of 
assets considered the riskiest, their results are in line with those of my paper, that 
is, when both men and women invest in the asset class they consider most risky, 
women are more likely to invest the smallest portion of their portfolio in that asset 
class. 
In the case of my paper, even if it is possible to infer the role of cultural level on the 
aversion to risk, it does not matter because the aim of the paper is to identify more 
sensible categories that cannot enjoy the whole benefits of the TFR reform, 
independently of their financial expertise. It would have been interesting to 
explore the size of the role of financial knowledge only if the possible relief of 
giving everybody an elevated culture (or  a sufficient financial knowledge) would 
be feasible, but it is clearly too expensive both by a social and an economic view.  
In the case of studies done by surveys the main drawbacks are the following. First, 
when asked about willingness to pay, individuals tend to underreport, which 
overestimates their true risk aversion (Kachelmeir and Shehata, 1992). Second, 
answers may be affected by how questions are framed. Third, the validity of this 
methodology rests on the assumption that respondents know how they would 
behave in a hypothetical settings and that they are willing to reveal truthfully their 
choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Also experiments has been used frequently, but in most of the cases the size of the 
sample is even smaller. For example Felton, Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2003) 
examine the role of gender and optimism in determining the attitude for risk in 
investment choices of 66 undergraduates students with both monetary and 
academic incentives.  
Grable, Lytton and O’Neill (2004) survey 421 relatively young individuals (average 
age of 32.03) via the internet and find that men report a higher risk tolerance score 
than women. Even though gender difference was not the focus of their study (that 
investigates if projection bias, as explained by regret theory, shape financial risk 
tolerance attitudes), they find that gender plays an important role in explaining the 
attitude toward taking investment risks. However, their study does not control for 
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other variables (considered in my paper), such as income and age which are known 
to explain risk-tolerance. 
Compared to surveys, it is however more difficult to link lab experiment findings to 
actual behavior outside of the lab, partly because subjects are typically students 
who typically have not yet faced actual financial decisions, partly because they 
often are selected samples not representative of the population (Guiso and Sodini 
2012). This paper can be considered as a kind of large experiment, but results are 
not elicited in hypothetical setting but in real life choices. So it reflects individual 
risk attitudes in actual financial decision. 
If we look at relevant studies or comments of the complementary pension funds 
issues, it is appropriate to mention a study by the Bank of Italy that expresses 
worries about the size and the diffusion of the risk that the employees’ cumulated 
saving  is likely to result insufficient to finance the consumption in the retirement 
period. Beyond the mentioned TFR reform, few years before the Italian pension 
system changed radically, moving from total wages system (“sistema retributivo” to 
contributive system also called “pay-as-you-go”). This change implied a remarkable 
fall of the pension size. The social security risk (that we call also pension risk) is 
higher for those workers that not only will suffer a fall in the main pension, but 
also for those having a wealth and saving not suitable. 
The valuation of the suitability of the saving requires exercises that go beyond this 
discussion (that is focused on TFR reform), and should take into consideration both 
the overall wealth of each individual at time of retirement and the needs of 
consumption in the following years. To go deep in this, it is useful to read Skinner 
(2007) and Fornero at al. (2009). 
In any case, the study published by the Bank of Italy (Cappelletti and Guazzarotti 
2010) shows that the social security risk is mainly diffused among youths, 
employers from South and Island of Italy, employees of the private sector and 
workers in the lowest income clusters. The same study evaluates an empirical 
model that analyses the choice to join complementary pension funds according to 
many socio-demographic variables, substitution ratio between pension and last 
income, and dummies about financial literacy and pension literacy. The most 
significant explanatory variables are the income and level of instruction of the 
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breadwinner. While the age of the worker encumbers on the probability to join 
complementary pension fund negatively. 
To have an idea of the size of the phenomena, the Minister of the Economy of Italy 
estimates that in case of a private employee depositing the complete TFR in a 
pension fund, 30 years later (according to a yield after tax of 3%) he/she will 
receive a complementary pension of about 15% of his/her last income (that is 1/5 of 
the overall pension income). Starting from this, workers choosing for 30 years a 
high risk fund could receive till 25% of his/her last income, making of really 
important interest the choice of the category of risk.  
According the Bank of Italy, from 2002 to 2008, 70% of workers chose a low 
category of risk, while the remaining part opted for a high risk category. In any 
case the size of the sample used for that study is not enough to built a statistically 
significant model in order to analyze the risk aversion. But their simple statistics 
show higher propensity to the risk for younger workers.  
In 2010, another study (Cappelletti, Guazzarotti and Tommasino, 2010), belonging 
to the paper series of the Bank of Italy, takes into consideration a small Italian 
sample that differs largely from the Italian population. In fact it differs largely from 
the survey on household income and wealth (SHIW), commonly used in Italian 
papers on Household Finance. In the study they estimate a multivariate probit 
model that takes into consideration the fund level of risk joined by about 3800 
people mainly clerical or managerial workers. They focus on the effect of age on 
the risk aversion, after controlling for some socio-demographic characteristics, and 
find a pronounced tendency to choose safer portfolios as people age. Moreover, 
they try also to model characteristics that make participation in pension funds more 
active, analyzing the switches. The paper, at first sight could be defined similar to 
what I provide. But apart very different datasets and econometric models used, the 
aim of the two studies is extremely different. They suggest that life cycle funds 
could be a valuable instrument, given that they automatically bring all the 
participants toward less risky allocations as they get near to retirement. While I 
focus on characteristics making workers by nature more risk adverse. Furthermore, 
I use the switches and the flag trading in order to verify conditions making the 
individual more or less risk adverse. In few words, I focus on the opportunities lost 
by such people due to the last TFR reform. I explain that, utility maximization at 
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time t in choosing a certain category of risk is not the same than choosing a 
category at time t+n. In fact, most of the workers will not enjoy enough pension to 
provide their consume. This can strengthen the so called social security risk, that 
can lead to higher public disbursement to safeguard retirees wealth. 
 
Section 3.1 The 2006 TFR reform in Italy and brief 
history of Fopen 
This study took inspiration by the pension reform that in 2007 shocked millions of 
Italian workers. It really changed the way the severance indemnity (TFR, 
Trattamento di fine rapporto) was accumulated. TFR, or severance indemnity is a 
payment due to workers upon termination of their employment. In Italy, this 
measure was introduced back in the early 20th century for social security but also 
for welfare reasons on account of the loss of the employment. Originally, it was 
paid to white collars only, and progressively it was also extended to blue collars. 
Severance indemnity is now regulated under article 2120 of the Italian Civil Code. 
It is calculated on an annual basis and is equal to 6.91% of the remuneration. Upon 
termination of employment, the indemnity amount is revaluated with a rate equal 
to 75% of the inflation rate, plus 1.5% as fixed rate. At fiscal level, a distinct 
taxation regime applies to severance indemnity (previously not taxed): the rate is 
equal to the average rate for personal income tax over the previous five years (with 
a minimum threshold of 23%), while revaluations are taxed at 11%. From January 
1st 2007, companies with over 50 employees must pay the severance indemnity, not 
transferred by the worker to supplementary pension schemes, to INPS (the national 
pension scheme). However, this does not affect the workers’ rights, as they will 
continue to be entitled to, as prescribed by law (termination of employment, early 
termination, etc.), a severance indemnity from their companies, which will then 
recover such amounts from INPS. 
The reform pushed workers toward a totally new culture: from a world in which 
pensions were guaranteed by society as a whole to one where they are ever more 
resting on one individual’s informed participation in choosing how much to invest 
and which balance to strike in the trade-off between risk and return. Due to the 
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2005 reform, within 30th June 2007, or within 6 months from recruitment, when 
dated after the 1st of January 2007, workers may: 
- keep their severance indemnity in their company; 
- transfer it to specific supplementary pension schemes; 
- not take any decision. 
Figure 1 
 
In the first case, companies with over 50 employees must pay the severance 
indemnity, not transferred by the worker to supplementary pension schemes, to 
INPS (the Italian Public Social Security Institute). 
In the second case the employee has to choose a specific complementary pension 
form where to put TFR: collective (Closed/Open Pension Funds) or individual 
(Open Pension Funds or PIPs). In the collective schemes contributions come from 
both employer and employee, as established by agreements. In the individual 
schemes employer’s contributions are optional. 
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In the former case, the severance indemnity, as it accrues, will be transferred by the 
employer to the pension scheme indicated in the collective labour contracts or, 
failing that, in a specific supplementary pension scheme called Fondinps set up by 
INPS. The decision to transfer the severance indemnity to a pension scheme may 
not be revoked, whereas the decision to keep the severance indemnity in the 
company may be changed with a view to join a supplementary pension scheme. 
In my analysis I used this big shock in order to test risk aversion among individuals 
that liked to transfer their TFR to Fopen. In fact, data has been taken by the 
collective closed pension funds of the Enel Group, a fund chosen by more than 40 
thousand people in the last years, that is one of the biggest in Italy, managing more 
than 1 trillion euros. 
The history of Fopen is a little longer than the TFR reform. In fact it was born in 
1999. Anyway, the first collection began on the 16th November 2000, but till the 
16th April 2002 the fund invested only in short-term bonds (free of risk 
investment). Since then, there has been the introduction of a unique risky category 
(called “Unico”), where 62% of the total was invested in bonds and 38% in stocks, a 
rather risky portfolio. Only since the 16th of June 2003 has been introduced the 
opportunity of choice among multiple categories (4 different level of risk: 
“Monetario”, “Bilanciato Obbligazionario”, “Bilanciato” and “Prevalentemente 
Azionario”. On the 1st of April 2006 a fifth category has been added 
(“Obbligazionario”) and finally in August 2007 a Monetary similar category has 
been added (“Monetario Classe Garanzia”). 
To sum up, at the time of data (May 2012) workers can choose among 6 different 
risk categories (but with only 5 levels of risk). The investment limit in stocks in 
each fund is : 70% for the riskiest (Prevalentemente Azionario),  50% for the 
second risky fund (Bilanciato), 30% for the third (Bilanciato Obbligazionario), 10% 
for the fourth (Obbligazionario), 0% for the lowest (Monetario e Monetario Classe 
Garanzia).  
The choice of joining the FOPEN is subsidized by Enel through a money incentive 
in the size of the 1.35% of the gross wage. So that the majority of employees prefer 
to join this fund instead of the public one mentioned before. This is important 
because allow us to examine even subjects slightly more risk adverse. Moreover, 
many workers joined the Fopen voluntary, much earlier than the reform passed or 
17 
 
has been even discussed. In the next sections this difference will be exploited in 
order to have a kind of control group (we can assume that who enrolled to the 
Fopen in earlier stage are more interested in finance or at least they have more 
familiarity with financial decisions). 
 
Section 3.2 The Dataset 
The source of this paper is composed of 3 main dataset (see figures 3,4 and 5): 
“soci”, “switch” and “quote socio”. The first set contains more than 43 thousand 
anonymous but coded individual. It contains the following information: 
individual’s code, year of birth, gender, kind of participation, date of enrollment, 
province of residence, region, percentage of voluntary personal contribution, 
contribution by the firm, percentage of tfr versato in the the fund, personal 
contribution in euro and contribution of tfr in euro. 
The second set called “switch” contains more than 59 thousand changes of 
categories, done by anonymous but coded individuals. It is composed of these 
information: individual’s code (that can be linked to the first dataset), year of birth, 
date of enrollment, current status (if active or left), date of change of risk profile, 
cumulated contribution at time of change, name of category of origin, name of 
category of entry, number of shares, value of a share. 
The last set, “quote socio”, contains the following columns: individual’s code (that 
can be linked to the other datasets), current category (updated to May 2012), 
number of shares, value of a share, cumulated contribution. 
Most of the variables are transformed in categorical variable, and then transformed 
in many dummy variables. The variable “age” is divided into 4 categories: A- under 
36 years old, B- between 36 and 46 years old, C-from 46 to 53 years old and D- over 
53 years old. The variable “region” is composed of 5 types: A- islands, B- south, C- 
Centre, D- north-east, E- North-west. The variable “trading” is a dummy that 
identifies with 1 who change category more than once. The variable “income” is 
obtained dividing the voluntary contribution in euro by the voluntary percentage 
of income and then divided into 4 categories: A- up to 1900€, B- from 1900 to 
2500€, C- from 2500€ to 2900€ and D- over 2900€.  
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Looking at the figures 6 and 7, it is easy to extrapolate some descriptive statistics 
about our sample of employees (37366 still active subjects, even if Fopen has 
accounted for more than 50 thousand individuals since 1999). Males are the 
preponderant part of the dataset4 with about 83.6% (31227 men) of the sample. The 
distribution of the sample among Italian region is more equilibrated (Enel has been 
the monopolist in the Energy sector till in the 90s). In fact 20.6% of employees live 
in the South, 13.3% in the Islands, 27.5% in the Centre, 15.6 in the North-East and 
the 23.1% in the North-West. With respect the usual Italian population 
distribution, it appears a little predominance of the Centre Region due to the 
presence of the Enel Headquarter. 
Since the first sight to the data (see figure 8), it is evident that the percentage of 
subjects within regional clusters choosing for riskier categories such as 
“Prevalentemente Azionario” or “Bilancianto” is higher in North-East (36.54%) and 
Centre (31.85%) areas. Moreover within gender clusters is easy to notice 
differences in preference between men and women (see figure 9): while 13.85% of 
women choose the less risky categories (“Classe Garanzia”, “Monetario”, 
“Obbligazionario”), only the 10.5% of men do the same choice, with a gap of 3.35%. 
In the same way, if we look at the part of women choosing for the highest risk 
category (“Prevalentemente Azionario”) the gap between women and men is 5.69% 
in favor of men. That is, the percentage of women choosing for this class is only 
7.49%, against the 13.18% of men. Looking at other general statistics in figure 10, 
we see which percentage of subjects within their age group opts for riskier funds. It 
is evident the downward trend as the age group goes up. For example the 
percentage of workers in the cluster “under 36” the choices for the 2 highest 
categories is 44.85%, it slows down to 36.43% for the cluster “36-46”, 28.51% for 
the group “46-53” and finally reaches 18.89% for the oldest group “over 53”. 
Analyzing the sample under the “income” view, it is marked the preference for 
more austere income towards less risky categories. In fact, as seen in figure 11, 
                                                           
4 In my tests I finally consider (in session 4.4) also this unbalance towards men using the 
same technique of Olivares and Al. (2006) taking as point of measures the change in 
proportion within gender variable. 
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16.17% of workers earning less than 1900€ per month prefer less risky categories 
such as (“Classe Garanzia”, “Monetario”, “Obbligazionario”), while among who earn 
more than 2900€ per month the percentage slows down to 9.7% (exhibiting a 
monotonic decrease in this case as well). 
It is very important to underline the fact that the younger is the worker the less 
she/he is likely to have an high income (see figure 12 and 13). If we see the 
composition of the group of employees earning up to 1900€ per month we see that 
the vast majority is made of workers younger than 36 years old. While if we see the 
composition of the group of workers older than 53, they earn mostly between 
2500€ and 2900€ or even more than 2900€. This detail is to be taken into 
consideration under the light of the following econometric study (section 4.2). In 
fact, it means that to be young lead toward a more risky category, but to be young 
usually implies to earn less as well and so, choosing for a less risky fund. The 2 
effects behave in opposite direction, making it more interesting to discover the 
power of them. Anyway this help the model to avoid trivial conclusion and avoid 
heterogeneity issues (the 2 factors in this way are well decomposable).  
 
Section 4.1 Econometric model 
In the first two analysis of this paper, after a careful consideration, I decided, as in 
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), to use a logistic regression model in order to discover 
the main variables affecting the size of risk aversion.  A logistic regression, also 
called a logit model, is used to model dichotomous outcome variables. 
Workers  choose to join a determined category of risk sub-fund if unobserved 
relative indirect utility	 ≡  !"#!$%& − '()*!"#!$%* > 0,	where	
′ = -′. + 0 
Here, -′ is a vector of observables, and 0 represents unobserved factors 
influencing relative utility with a logistic cumulative distribution. 
 In the logit model the log odds of the outcome is modeled as a linear combination 
of the predictor variables. Since I tested the risk aversion through the preference of 
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each individual (more than 37 thousand observations) in choosing a risky category 
or not risky category, or the willingness to switch for a less or more risky category, 
the dependent variable is structured as binomial.  
It is not the only one way to describe conditional probabilities. Another common 
method is the classic OLS regression. This model, when used with a binary response 
variable, it is known as a linear probability model. However, as first drawback, the 
errors from the linear probability model violate the homoscedasticity5 and 
normality (because the criterion has only two values) of errors assumptions of OLS 
regression, resulting in invalid standard errors and hypothesis tests. The second 
disadvantage is that the OLS model does not properly restrict the range of the 
dependent variable to the unit interval, as it should, because it is supposed to be a 
probability. Therefore, nonsensical predictions outside the (0,1) interval are 
possible if extreme values of regressors are considered. 
But as we will see later on, an extraordinary advantage belongs to OLS model: 
parameters can be interpreted directly as marginal effects, and the approximation is 
good as long as we do not move too far away from the means of the explanatory 
variables. 
An early treatment of the logit model can be found in Berkson (1944) who 
considered this model in the context of estimating the effect of a continuous 
treatment on a binary outcome by the subject. This model specifies: 
1	= 23-.4 =
5635’84
9	:	5635’84           (eq. 1) 
And clearly ensures that 0	 < 	1 	< 	1. Moreover, in contrast to a similar (and also 
very use) model called probit, choice probabilities are available in closed-form and 
it does not need to integrate in order to obtain the probability. Logistic distribution 
function is flatter than the distribution function of the standard normal. In 
addition, it is very similar to the probit function. In fact, results of this paper can be 
easily rescaled in probit form: empirically the factor 0.625 can be used to 
approximate the parameter estimates in the probit model from the logit one. 
                                                           
5 ;  can take only two values, zero and one. Hence the implicit regression error 0 = ; −
-′. can take only two values, 0 − -′. and 1 − -′. so it follows that <=30|-4 = -′.31 −
-′.4, thus the error term is heteroscedastic. 
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Another useful and very common expedient (in the statistics literature) that the 
specific structure of the logit model offers, is the odds interpretation.  
From eq. 1:  
1	
1 − 1 = 	?-@3-’.4 		⇒ 			BC D
1
1 − 1E 	= 	-’F	
Here 1/1 − 1 measures the probability that Y=1 relative to the probability that Y=0 
and is called the odds ratio or relative risk. For example, consider in this case Y=1 
denotes the choice of the highest risk category (within the fund) and y=0 denotes 
any other category and regressors include a measure of income. An odd ratio of 2 
means that the odds of choosing the highest category are twice those of picking any 
other. For the logit model the log-odds ratio is linear in the regressors. 
From the literature, I learnt the following consideration, that is, although OLS 
estimation with heteroskedastic standard errors can be a useful exploratory data 
analysis tool, it is best to use the logit model for final data analysis. 
 
Section 4.2 Logistic Regressions with standardized 
data 
 In the first part of this study I adopt a logistic regression using data contained in 
the datasets called “Soci” and “Quote Soci”. The observed outcome is a dummy 
linked in one case to belong to the highest risk category (“Prevalentemente 
azionario”), while in the other case to belong to the lowest risk category 
(“Monetario”). That is, Y=1 if the employee belongs to the risk section of interest 
(in one case the highest, while in the other the lowest), Y=0 if the employee does 
not belong to the risk section of interest (as before). The joint analysis of both cases 
places the model between the standard binary logit model and the ordered logit 
model. 
After defining the available variables included in the dataset, factors (H) are 
selected through a Stepwise method. At this point it is fundamental to assess the 
fitness of the model through the percentage of concordant. That is, taken a couple 
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of observation with I=1 and I)=0, it is called concordant if J > J), tied if J = J) 
and discordant if J < J). In the assessment of the fitness I take into account 4 
indexes. 
Somers’D = 
KLM
N  
Gamma = 
KLM
K:M 
Tau-a =  
KLM
3O.Q'3'L944 
c = 3R + 0.5T4/U 
As those indexes obtain higher score, the higher is the fitness of the model. In fact, 
higher values correspond to a stronger association between predicted values and 
observed ones. 
Then we look at the joint significance of the coefficients through the Likelihood 
ratio test, Score test and Wald test. After the joint significance, I checked for the 
significance of the single coefficients. 
Then, the presence of multicollinearity has been checked, analyzing the correlation 
matrix of the regressors included in the model. In the case of 2 or more regressors 
strongly correlated, I deleted those presenting a lower correlation with our 
explained variable6. At the end of this selection process I run again the model 
including only the survival independent variables.  After this procedure, the logistic 
model on standardized data is able to supply scores of sensitivity of the selected 
factor. At the base of this affirmation there is the standardization process, that 
allows an objective interpretation of the coefficients of the different factors. They 
can be compared because they are in the same unit and can be represented on a 
graph with a common scale. It means, that even if the results belong to 2 different 
regressions (with a totally different dependent variable), they can be compared and 
taken as part of the same regression. It is useful not only to look at the coefficients 
but also to their respective odd-ratios. For the moment it is not relevant the 
analysis of the marginal effect because of the standardization process. But, anyway, 
                                                           
6 I look the coefficients of linear correlation between the dependent variable and the whole 
potential regressors 
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it is important to highlight the fact that the logit model is not a linear model since 
23. 4 is a non-linear function. Therefore, the parameter .Vassociated with the l-th 
element in - does not directly measure the marginal effect. But we will explain it 
in detail during the presentation of the second analysis. 
Now, it is better to focus on the result of the first regression (called R1a), where 
I = 1 if employee opted for the highest risk category, while I = 0 for any other. 
The best model (see table 1) obtained after a strictly selection process includes 12 
factors plus the intercept. Analyzing the sign of the coefficients we are able to 
indicate the following (figure 14 offers a clear view of the results). 
Our main variable of interest is gender. Gender dummy scores 0.2921 and it is 
significant since its p-value is lower than 0.0001. The odd-ratio associated7 at this 
score is 1.339 with a limit of confidence between 1.288 and 1.393. This variable 
behaves in line with most of the literature (and is compatible with what we argue 
in describing the social issue of the reform), that is, females are more risk adverse 
than males. This dummy is verified thanks to the introduction of many other 
control variables.  
Since we have the youngest age clusters with a positive sign (0.3139 and 0.1838) 
and the oldest cluster with a negative one (-0.345), it means that age play a relevant 
role in choosing a determined risk category. These coefficients are significant, in 
fact their p-value are lower than 0.0001. It can be easily affirmed that the older is 
the employee the less likely he/she will choose a risky category. That is, elders are 
more risk adverse (and scores are monotonic in age). 
Also the variable income is present in this regression. In fact, the dummy of the 
cluster of the richest employee is significant but with a p-value of 0.0092 and its 
coefficient scores 0.0612 (positive), meaning that richer employees are less risk 
adverse. 
Then 3 dummies refer to the macro-regional areas: positive and significant 
coefficient for the flag North-east (0.1567), negative and significant coefficients for 
the flags Islands and South (-0.0736 and -0.1246). These variables can be 
                                                           
7 At the moment we do not consider the real marginal effect as these regressions are in 
standardized data 
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interpreted in the same direction but with 3 different causes. In fact, it seems that 
living in most developed region of Italy makes subjects less risk adverse. It can be 
due to economic factors, social factors or cultural factors. Better economic 
conditions can have an impact on the background risk. In fact, for the Enel 
employees there is no background risk, but each worker lives in a different 
economic context and it is more likely that in the less developed regions the 
partner is unemployed, making the weight of the income coming from the 
employee more important to the family wealth. Unfortunately, we have no data 
about the marital status of the subject nor about other kind of family income. But 
also social factors can have an impact on the sensitivity to take risks. People living 
in the South of Italy or in the Islands, traditionally grow with stronger bias against 
risk. Another cause is the propensity (cultural factors) of people living in more 
developed regions to take studies in economic and financial studies (or anyway a 
simple higher index of schooling). Whatever is the causes, the model seems to work 
in the right direction even for these variables. 
In this model only a variable does not work as it could: the position accrued (also 
called accrued balance). We can consider it as a proxy for wealth, or at least it is a 
form of raw asset property. This factor does not show a coherent behavior because 
in both regressions R1a and R2a have the same sign. In fact the variable at the same 
time (it is negative) pushes the worker to not choose nor the highest nor the lowest 
risk category. This means that it does not work, and as matter of fact it cannot 
reflect the wealth of the agent, or it means that people with huge accrued balance 
prefer a category of risk that is in the middle, that is, he/she decides to not choose. 
Another important factor, that we will find also later on, is the dummy about 
trading. This is a peculiar (and original) explanatory variable. An element of 
innovation in this kind of studies. This variable can be taken as a proxy very linked 
to the financial expertise. In this regression it works as expected: the coefficient is 
0.6202 that is not only positive but also significantly very high. The associated odd-
ratio is 1.859, that could impact very much on selecting higher risk categories. This 
imply that financial knowledge lead people to be less risk adverse. The inclusion in 
the model of this control variable makes the gender dummy even more important, 
because it let us to reject the “expertise dominates gender” hypothesis as in 
Beckmann and Menkohoff (2008). 
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In the second part of the test I run a second regression (R2a) on the same data. But 
this time I set Y=1 for subjects belonging to the lowest risk category and Y=0 for 
the control group choosing for any other category. In this case the best model 
includes 9 variables (see table 2). 
There are many confirmations with respect the first regression  (figure 14 offers a 
clear view of the results). The most relevant is about gender. In fact, in this case the 
coefficient associated to the dummy is negative (-0.0882) with a p-value lower than 
0.0001. That is, men are not likely to choose the lowest category in risk, confirming 
the higher risk aversion of women. Considering the score, in this case the effect is 
less marked but compatible with our expectations. 
Among the control variables, age works very well. Here we find opposite scores 
with respect the first regression. This confirms and strengthens our previous 
statements that elders are more risk adverse after controlling for income. In fact, 
the coefficient for the youngest cluster (till 36 years old and between 36 and 46 
years old) are both negative (-0.2536 and -0.0832), while that for the oldest one is 
positive (0.1555). Scores show a monotonic behavior in age also in the second 
regression. So, elders are more likely to prefer the less risky category (“Monetario”). 
In the second regression there is not income variable. But it is not important, 
because it would only have confirmed what accepted in the first regression. Here, 
the dummies referring to macro-geographical areas still prove that living in 
developed areas makes subject less risk adverse. In fact, in this regression there are 
2 significant geographical variables. The flag South has a positive coefficient 
(0.0821), while the flag North-East has a negative one (-0.0575). The respective p-
values are 0.0002 and 0.02. This means that the symmetrical result is confirmed: in 
the first regression the flag South is -0.1246, implying less likelihood for a South 
resident to choose an high risk category, but in the second regression, when the 
dependent variable is the log odd-ratio of choosing the lowest risk category, the flag 
South become positive. This kind of exercise is very useful to re-test the first 
regression results. 
A very strong and important confirmation is taken from the variable “trading”. This 
dummy, as said before, is an important proxy for financial knowledge. While in the 
first part the sign is very positive (0.62), in the second regression is negative (-
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0.3582), that is coherent with our statement. People with higher financial 
knowledge are less risk adverse and dislike monetary (and so safe) investments.  
In order to test the role of the financial knowledge and the effect of the reform for 
people not in the habit with financial investment, I run other regressions (R1b and 
R2b)8 with the same variables of the above discussed models. In both configuration 
(Y=1 if the choice is for the highest risk category and Y=0 for others or Y=1 if the 
choice is for the lowest risk category and Y=0 for others) I introduce another 
variable called “Inscription after a certain date”. Establishing as cut date July 2007, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is negative and significant (-0.1179 with a p-
value lower than 0.0001) in case of the first kind of regression and positive and 
significant (0.1044 with a p-value lower than 0.0001) in the second case. This 
further test confirms that forced participants are more risk averse. As matter of fact, 
this implies that employees that voluntary enrolled to the FOPEN before the 
reform in most of the cases made a conscious choice and suffer of lower risk 
aversion. While employees who joined the fund only after the reform suffer higher 
aversion to the risk. The important matter is that even under this specific control 
variable, gender continues to be fundamental in the choice. One could criticize a 
drawback of this variable because it is linked to the last double deep recession. In 
fact, it could have happen that workers were discouraged to invest in higher risk. 
But, it is fair to remember that data about category refers to May 2012, and 
moreover the variable refers to the date of inscription, that is, it is not analyzed the 
differences in investment behaviors before and after the cut date, but the behavior 
of subject enrolled before or after that date. In this case, the variable is used only to 
distinguish workers that joined to Fopen “voluntary” and those “forced” by the 
reform, and it is not used to distinguish the fund chosen before or after that date. 
At this point, before going to the next model, I would like to spend few words on 
the goodness of fit indices of this model. As written before, one of the most 
important measure of goodness of fit, are those about the concordant pairs. In R1a 
the percentage of concordant pairs (over the maximum combination of over 150 
million pairs) is 76.3%, implying a Somers’D of 0.531, a Gamma of 0.534 and a Tau-
a of 0.114. It means that the model is good to shape the phenomena, assigning 
higher or less probability in the right direction (in the next section “the switch 
                                                           
8 For the whole results see table 3 and 4. 
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analysis”, since data are not standardized, really probability marginal effect is 
assigned for each observable -). In R1b, the pairs analyzed are about 108 millions, 
65.9% of them are concordant. In this case the Somers’ D (0.33), the Gamma (0.334) 
and the Tau-a (0.051) are not as good as in R1a, but still relevant. Looking at R2a 
and R2b, it is noticeable that the percentage of concordant and respective indices 
are similar to R1a R1b, showing good fit of the model. Moreover, in each 
regression, all the tests of joint null hypothesis (Likelihood Ratio, Score and Wald) 
are rejected, so restricted and unrestricted models are not equivalent.  
 
Section 4.3 The “ Switch Analysis” 
In the second part of the econometric session, I take data from the switch dataset. 
In this case, I am able to explore in the sample more than 35 thousand switches. 
Switches are divided into two groups: toward riskier categories, for example from 
totally monetary fund to balanced bond fund, and toward less risky fund, for 
example from mostly equity to monetary fund. So, Y will take the value of 1 for 
riskier switch and 0 for safer switch.  
I estimate a logistic model where the main explanatory variables are as above: 
gender, attitude to trade, age, wealth (cumulated balance), geographical factor and 
income. Income is the most controversial variable. In fact, the deep dataset used for 
this analysis has the drawback that data describing income refers to 2012. For this 
reason, it does not create a problem in the previous  econometric session that refers 
only to 2012, but in the case of the switch analysis, such a switch could have 
happen since 2003 but the worker wage refers to 2012. To partially overcome this 
issue and to make income comparables, I divide the income of each observation by 
1,03^32012 − ;?Z	[\	]ℎZC_?4. In this way, probably I do not obtain the true 
wage for that worker in that year but at least I will have the real wage of the future 
true income9. Anyway as it is possible to see in the tables, the models with or 
without income variable do not differ so much. 
                                                           
9 It is the discounted income that the worker will obtain in the near future (and she/he can 
forecast quite accurately). 
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Looking at the most appropriate model (we call it R3a), with the most adequate and 
significant factors, proceeding as for the first session of tests, we can affirm the 
following (see table 5 including partial effects as well): the financial knowledge 
(flag trading), age, income and geographical factor are significant. In detail, flag for 
trading is not only significant but it has also an high influence on the probability to 
switch toward higher categories of risk. In this session, as anticipated before, since 
data are not standardized it is possible to calculate the average marginal effect. The 
logit model is non-linear function. Therefore, the parameter .V associated with the 
l-th element in - does not directly measure the marginal effect  `
3a|54
`5b
=
	c1/c-V . Rather applying the chain rule of differentiation, we obtain the marginal 
probability effect (MPE). 
dJV = _3-′.4.V 
The simplest method is computing the partial effects for the average individual in 
the sample, that is c1/c-V = 131 − 14.V , substituting 1 = ;e, yields a crude 
estimated marginal effect of ;e31 − ;e4.Vf . This is the method to which it is referred 
in this test. But I try, also to calculate the so called “average marginal probability 
effect” (AMPE). I include also this method because when the explanatory variables 
are binary, computing the effect of an infinitesimal change of -V can be highly 
inaccurate. So to assess the average of the marginal effect of each independent 
variable I proceed using:  ∆1V = 2h-′. + ∆-V.Vi − 23-′.4. In the tables also this 
kind of marginal effect is presented, but it does not differ very much from the 
outcome obtained using the simplest method. 
In this test, to be a trader increases the probability to switch for higher risk 
category by 32.75%. Also dummies for age affect the probability to switch to higher 
or lower risk categories. For example, workers younger than 36 years old have 
4.44% more chance to switch to riskier sub-funds. While an individual between 46 
years old and 53 years old have 2.31% less probability to pass to a higher category 
of risk. Looking at income, there are two significant categories (the 2 highest 
income level), from 2500€ to 2900€ and over 2900€ that increase probability to pass 
to higher category respectively by 5.43% and by 4.25%. The geographical flags 
work extremely well. In fact, belonging to less developed areas decrease the 
probability to choose higher risk categories by 4.58% if resident in the South, while 
by 4.73% if resident in the Islands. A resident in the North-East, the most 
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developed area, has 3.54% more chance to switch to higher risk sub-fund. Results 
are in line with previous session, but in this case the variable gender is not selected 
by the step-wise selection method. The only mismatched is about the dummy for 
older than 53 years old, that enters in the regression but with an unexpected sign 
(even though in the complete model R3b, the sign becomes coherent with the 
whole study and theory). 
To go deep with the results, I run a complete model (R3b) with the whole range of 
categories for each variable. Looking at table 6, the whole set of variables is 
available. Each category responds according the theoretical expectations.  The only 
variable that does not work exactly as it does in the first econometric section (4.2) 
nor as in theory is the income variable. The explanation could be found out in the 
definition of the variable. In fact, it refers to the income of 2012 and despite the 
treatment (as written before), it is impossible to attribute the right wage as 
collected at the time of the switch. In addition, as in the stepwise regression, gender 
is not significant. Both for R3a and R3b the goodness of fit is excellent. For example 
in R3b the percentage of concordant is very high (76.4%) and in R3b it is 71.1%. 
Moreover, the test of the null hypothesis is rejected for the whole 3 methods taken 
into consideration. 
As written before, our analyses is dedicated mainly to the identification of 
categories of workers, that due to innate aversion to risk, are not able to choose the 
most appropriate pension fund in order to finance their future consumption (during 
pension period). For this reason, to get confirmation that gender plays a crucial role 
in investment decision by the dataset switch as well, I proceed with the 
presentation of a similar regression but with a slightly different definition of the 
dependent variable. It is useful to highlight that till March 2003, the whole workers 
enrolled before that date belonged to a unique risk category called “Unico”. After 
that date, different risk categories has been created. Of course, everybody had to 
choose one of the risk categories. Who did not express any preference was enrolled 
by default in a medium-low risk category called “Bilanciato Obbligazionario”10. So I 
try to sterilize the regression from this kind of observation11, obtaining the 
                                                           
10 See Section 3 for more specific information. 
11 In the base regression (R3a and R3b), since the switch is toward a slightly less risky 
category than “Unico”, I taped it as Y=0. 
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following results (see table 7). In this case, after the sterilization of the default 
choice, the model R4a shows 9 dummies belonging to 4 different variables. The 
whole set of dummies responds in a perfect way12. Maybe because in this way only 
conscious choices are taken into account in the analysis. After that, we have many 
confirmations: the relationship between likelihood to switch to riskier sub-funds 
and age is confirmed in a monotonic way, that is, as the agent becomes older the 
less is the probability13 to change for riskier sub-funds. Also income is significant 
and coherent with our expectations, actually, as income increases, also the 
probability to switch toward riskier categories increases. Geographical factor still 
continue to be significant and with sign compatible to the theory: living in the 
South (-0.1754) makes a change toward riskier assets less likely, but living in the 
North-East (0.2362) or North-West (0.1271) area makes riskier choice more likely. 
Despite so many control variables, gender dummy is now significant and positive 
(0.2845). In light of this regression we can confirm our intuitions, that is, over 36 
years old14 female worker living in less developed areas with a lower income is 
really likely to suffer pension risk.  
In table 8 it is possible to have an idea of the marginal effect of single 
characteristics. And looking at regression R4b, where I use the same construction 
but avoiding a stepwise selection and including the whole regressors, it is possible 
to assess the overall effect of such weak worker. In fact from the model R4b, I take 
as default equation (where all independent dummy variables are zero) a female 
worker with an age between 36 and 46 years old, earning between 1900€ and 2500€ 
per month and living in the Centre of Italy. If such a worker instead of being 
female were male, the probability to be less risk averse increases by 5.76%. The 
next two cases indicate the changes in the predicted probability consequent to 
marginal changes in other demographic factors (live in the South or be older than 
53 years old). It shows that an older person (over 53 years old), ceteris paribus, is 
                                                           
12 In line with regressions R1a & R2a and most of the literature. 
13
 Here, I refer to coefficients, but marginal effects (having the same sign as the coefficients) 
are available in the table 7. 
14
 Even who belong in the age range 36-46 years old results a risk adverse subject, despite at 
this age is still highly advisable to choose a non-monetary fund. 
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less likely to switch to higher risk sub-fund15. If the worker lives in the South, the 
probability to pass to riskier category diminishes by 4.04%.  These are just few 
examples, but the reader can use the tables to find whatever effect he/she likes to 
investigate. 
The last part of this section, as outlined in the introduction, is dedicated (for 
completeness) to the analysis of the simultaneous first big switch of the Fopen 
members16. Excluding workers shifting from “Unico” to “Bilanciato obbligazionario” 
that can be considered mostly a default choice or a neutral change (since the weight 
of the equity was similar), 6593 choices are taken into account. 3690 observations 
refer to lower risk category changes (I = 0), while 2903 observations relate to 
switches toward higher risk categories (I = 1). Regression R5a, exhibited in table 
9, shows even more marked results than in the whole sample regression. Results are 
not only significant, but also coherent with both my expectations and those of the 
theory. The only variable showing contrasting direction is the flag of trading, with 
a coefficient of -1.9032 indicating higher risk aversion for traders. But the most 
central variable gender is not only positive and significant but exhibit a very high 
coefficient, that is, looking at the odd-ratio (2.109), gender affect the risk aversion 
attitude considerably. Also age shows a coherent behavior (and monotonic), as 
worker get old preferences to switch toward higher risk categories diminish. 
Another consistent result is about geographical factor: workers living in less 
developed areas opted for lower risk categories, while those living in the North-
East show lower risk aversion. In this regression it is important to remember that 
the variable income has been excluded before the stepwise method in order to do 
not affect the whole result. Then in R5b (table 10), I run a model with the same 
sample as R5a (only observations from “Unico”) but adding the default change 
(from “Unico” to “Bilanciato Obbligazionario”) in the I = 0. In this case the 
observations are 27034 and result are very similar to R5a. The only difference is 
                                                           
15
 In this case the probability to switch toward higher risk categories decreases by 17.35% 
16 As said before, on the 16th of June 2003 has been introduced the opportunity of choice 
among multiple categories (4 different level of risk: “Monetario”, “Bilanciato 
Obbligazionario”, “Bilanciato” and “Prevalentemente Azionario”). So workers had to choose 
a category to transfer their money from “Unico” category. Who did not make any choice 
was assigned by default to “Bilanciato Obbligazionario”. 
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that since this time the factor income has been included in the stepwise, it results 
that workers earning more than today equivalent 2900€ prefer to switch toward 
riskier categories, showing lower risk aversion (coherent with my expectations). 
 
Section 4.4 Tests of the Hypothesis 
In the last econometric session it is developed a test of hypothesis as in Olivares at 
Al (2008). We verify the existence of differences in the weight of men and women 
that change their portfolios within fund categories. This allows to eliminate the 
notion that part of previous results of the paper are driven by the number of 
women and men in the sample. First of all I divided the categories of risk into 2 
groups: one group called High Risk Fund (HRF) and another called Low Risk Fund 
(LRF). To the HRF belong “Bilanciato” and “Prevalentemente Azionario”. While 
the others, “Classe Garanzia”,” Monetario”, “Unico”, “Bilanciato Obbligazionario” 
belong to LRF17. Then, I test the null hypothesis expressed in the following 
equation: 
jO: hlmnopqV − lmnoorqVi = 0    
That is, I verify if proportion within females moving from LRF to HRF is higher 
than the same motion but within men18.   
Consistent with previous findings and Olivares et al (2008), results show that both 
gender move from lower risky fund when investors increase their income19and are 
younger20. Statistically speaking (test A1), as noticeable in table 11, the difference 
                                                           
17 The null hypothesis is rejected even if I take out from the sample the default option, that 
is, deleting from the sample workers passing from “Unico” to “Bilanciato Obbligazionario” 
(as in R4a and R4b). For this, see the following tests B1 and B2. 
18
 It is important to distinguish this method of classification with that used in section 4.3. In 
fact, in this case, changes toward riskier categories but within the same group (LRF or HRF) are 
not included in the numerator but in the denominator of lmno  . 
19 In Olivares (2008) it is referred to wealth instead of income. 
20
 Only about men 
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between the proportion of men that moves from LRF to HRF (21.19%) and the 
proportion of women doing the same (18.27%) is positive and significant (2.92%, 
with a p-value of the difference in weights lower than 0.0001). After introducing a 
filter selecting only workers with a wage higher than 2900€ the women risky 
weight increases slightly from 18.27% to 18.79%, while for men the weight goes 
from 21.19% to 21.85% (here the difference, 3.06%, is significant with a p-value of 
0.005). Adding the filter age the previous filter the proportion of women decreases 
to 17.19%, while the weight of men continues to grow reaching 22.04%. As 
Olivares e Al (2008) explains, women may chose the maternity and later children 
education, at this age, tending to stay in lower risky funds during motherhood 
period. Even in this case the difference in proportions is significant. So, from this 
test I can affirm that women are more risk averse than men when picking pension 
fund portfolios. 
In test B1 and B2 (table 12 and 13), I run the same test but excluding from the 
sample, the already illustrated, “default choice”, workers switching from “Unico” to 
“Bilanciato Obbligazionario”. In B1 it is analyzed the whole sample of subjects, 
while in B2 only switches done by members before 2007 are taken into account. 
Also in these tests, differences between men and women are significant, even after 
age and income filters.  
Moreover, taking inspiration from this kind of test, I run another test of null 
hypothesis (test C1) to assess the risk aversion of forced participants. That is, as 
written before, most of  workers, since January 2007, had to allocate their TFR in a 
pension fund. I test the following null hypothesis: 
jO: hlmno6OOs − lmno6t*(OOsi = 0 
Workers that joined Fopen before 2007, did it voluntary, but those who adhered 
after 2007 were mainly forced. From the analysis21, the null hypothesis is rejected 
and, as expected, the weight of workers passing from LRF to HRF who joined 
Fopen before 2007 (48.59%) is significantly higher than who adhered the fund after 
2007 (38.64%). So, I may conjecture that the reform created disparity between 
workers comfortable with financial decision and those without “financial literacy”. 
                                                           
21
 Results available in table 14. 
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Section 5 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to understand the consequences of sensible public reform, 
such as pension reform in Italy and the effect on certain categories of individuals. 
The Italian reform on TFR (“Trattamento di fine Rapporto”) provoked a very 
important shock in the pension system (for both households and firms). In 
literature, many studies used household finance data in order to model the risk 
aversion from an empirical point of view. Our conclusion are in line with most of 
the literature, but since the sample is at the same time very large and coming from 
effective real financial choices, this contribution to the household finance literature 
is quite unique. Throughout a delicate management of 3 datasets and a multitude of 
logistic regression (here only 10 are presented) and tests of hypothesis, I can 
provide significant statements on the main socio-demographic factors affecting risk 
aversion. Moreover, it is possible to extrapolate useful suggestions to the Italian 
legislator in order to reduce the pension risk. 
First of all, empirical evidence has been provided in evaluating gender differences 
in the choice of risk in private pension funds. Not only women show higher risk 
aversion while choosing their most suitable category of risk, but even in the 
following years they tend to switch toward less risky sub-funds. The tests run in 
this paper highlight also higher risk aversion for elders and people living in less 
developed areas such as South and Islands, while higher income makes the worker 
less risk averse (in both relative and absolute form). Also “financial literacy” 
matters, in fact workers trading more are less risk averse. In addition, forced 
participants show higher risk aversion.  
Further work could include the analysis of more sensitive information, collecting 
deeper information of each member through the FOPEN system. Moreover, the 
analysis can go beyond the usual geographical specification and could use real 
economic data (especially after the current double deep recession) for each city of 
living, providing careful statements on the effect of previous economic crisis on the 
individual risk aversion. 
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In light of these proven statements, the reform about the new destination of the 
TFR, issued to solve the problem of the conversion of the system to a “pay-as-you-
go” programme, still have important drawbacks. As marked by other eminent 
studies like Cesaratto, 2008), social security risk is one of the main issues of our 
society, and in the future is likely to be even more significant. The TFR is roughly 
equal to one month’s salary per year and is also called “deferred wage”. It means 
that the TFR stocks accumulated represents the second pillar of the pension flow 
and it will provide a complementary pension flow fluctuating between 15% and 
35% of the whole pension. In the light of these raw forecasts, the choice of risk 
category is fundamental, since different levels of risk correspond (theoretically and 
empirically) to different rate of return, as shown in figure 2 and figure 16. 
As relief, the State should provide incentives (like further tax breaks applied to 
riskier funds) for certain categories of workers that suffer largely of higher risk 
aversion. Otherwise, a solution could be a more efficient educational campaign, 
focused on sensitizing workers on the choice of the most appropriate destination of 
her/his TFR. 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 15 
 
Factors determing high risk aversion (choice of "Monetario")
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Tables 
Table 1 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker belongs to 
“Azionario”; Y=0 otherwise 
R1a 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 37366 
 Coefficient Std. Error Wald 
Chi-Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -2.3393 0.0211 12322.2 <.0001  
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.2921 0.0199 214.3 <.0001 1.339 
Flag trading (changes>1) 0.6202 0.0148 1755.4 <.0001 1.859 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.3139 0.022 202.9 <.0001 1.369 
Age cluster from 36 to 46 years 0.1838 0.0194 89.6 <.0001 1.202 
Age cluster over 53 years -0.345 0.0243 200.8 <.0001 0.708 
TFR contribution  0.2794 0.0325 73.7 <.0001 1.322 
% TFR 0.1417 0.031 20.9 <.0001 1.152 
Cumulated balance  -0.3717 0.0258 208.2 <.0001 0.69 
Income cluster over 2900 euro 0.0612 0.0235 6.78 0.0092 1.063 
Flag geographic area South -0.1246 0.0192 42.2 <.0001 0.883 
Flag geographic area Islands -0.0736 0.0187 15.5 <.0001 0.929 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.1567 0.0159 96.8 <.0001 1.17 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 76.3%  Somers’D 0.531 
Percentage of  tied pairs 0.5%  Gamma 0.534 
Percentage of discordant pairs 23.2%  Tau-a 0.114 
Number of pairs 150075253  c 0.766 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 3616.3 <.0001 
Score 3581.3 <.0001 
Wald 2975.7 <.0001 
 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 27791.8 24199.5 
SC 27800.3 24310.4 
-2 log L 27789.8 24173.5 
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Table 2 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker belongs to 
“Monetario”; Y=0 otherwise 
R2a 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 37366 
 Coefficient Std. Error Wald 
Chi-Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -2.953 0.0256 13260.4 <.0001  
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0882 0.0212 17.3 <.0001 0.916 
Flag trading (changes>1) -0.3582 0.032 125.5 <.0001 0.699 
Age cluster under 36 years old -0.2536 0.0332 58.2 <.0001 0.776 
Age cluster from 36 years to 46 years -0.0832 0.0289 8.3 0.004 0.92 
Age cluster over 53 years 0.1555 0.0267 33.9 <.0001 1.168 
% TFR -0.1988 0.0211 89.1 <.0001 0.82 
Cumulated balance -0.4102 0.0303 183.1 <.0001 0.664 
Flag geographic area South 0.0821 0.0218 14.2 0.0002 1.086 
Flag geographic area North-East -0.0575 0.0247 5.4 0.02 0.944 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 65.1%  Somers’D 0.321 
Percentage of  tied pairs 1.8%  Gamma 0.326 
Percentage of discordant pairs 33.1%  Tau-a 0.035 
Number of pairs 75912760  c 0.66 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 683.6 <.0001 
Score 658.2 <.0001 
Wald 633.5 <.0001 
   
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 16487.1 15821.6 
SC 16495.7 15906.9 
-2 log L 16485.1 15801.6 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker belongs to 
“Azionario”; Y=0 otherwise 
R1b 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 37366 
 Coefficient Std. Error Wald 
Chi-Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -2.3428 0.0211 12303.5 <.0001  
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.2923 0.02 214.4 <.0001 1.34 
Flag trading (changes>1) 0.6148 0.0148 1714.4 <.0001 1.849 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.3417 0.0225 230.9 <.0001 1.407  
Age cluster from 36 to 46 years 0.1838 0.0194 89.6 <.0001 1.202 
Age cluster over 53 years -0.3487 0.0244 204.8 <.0001 0.706 
TFR contribution  0.3042 0.033 85.0 <.0001 1.356 
% TFR 0.1461 0.0311 22.1 <.0001 1.157 
Cumulated balance  -0.4513 0.0293 238.0 <.0001 0.637 
Income cluster over 2900 euro 0.073 0.0236 9.5 0.002 1.076 
Flag geographic area South -0.1267 0.0192 43.6 <.0001 0.881 
Flag geographic area Islands -0.0736 0.0187 15.5 <.0001 0.929 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.1541 0.016 93.3 <.0001 1.167 
Inscription after 01/07/2007 -0.1179 0.02 34.68 <.0001 0.889 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 76.4%  Somers’D 0.533 
Percentage of  tied pairs 0.5%  Gamma 0.535 
Percentage of discordant pairs 23.1%  Tau-a 0.115 
Number of pairs 150075253  c 0.766 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 3651.2 <.0001 
Score 3615.5 <.0001 
Wald 2994.3 <.0001 
   
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 27791.8 24199.5 
SC 27800.3 24310.4 
-2 log L 27789.8 24173.5 
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker belongs to 
“Monetario”; Y=0 otherwise 
R2b 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 37366 
 Coefficient Std. Error Wald 
Chi-Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -2.5267 0.0211 14375.4 <.0001  
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0627 0.0179 12.3 0.0005 0.93 
Flag trading (changes>1) 0.264 0.0174 229.6 <.0001 1.302 
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years 0.0828 0.0247 11.2 0.0008 1.086 
Age cluster over 53 years 0.2674 0.0245 118.9 <.0001 1.307 
TFR contribution  0.1742 0.0325 28.8 <.0001 1.19 
% TFR -0.2686 0.0265 103.0 <.0001 0.764 
Cumulated balance -0.5805 0.0371 296.9 <.0001 0.56 
Flag geographic area South 0.0471 0.0187 6.4 0.0116 1.048 
Flag geographic area North-East -0.0582 0.0204 8.1 0.0044 0.943 
Inscription after 01/07/2007 0.1044 0.023 20.5 <.0001 1.11 
      
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 66.0%  Somers’D 0.331 
Percentage of  tied pairs 1.2%  Gamma 0.335 
Percentage of discordant pairs 32.8%  Tau-a 0.051 
Number of pairs 108525408  c 0.66 
     
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 1011.2 <.0001 
Score 991.2 <.0001 
Wald 950.0 <.0001 
 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 21725.1 20733.9 
SC 21733.6 20827.7 
-2 log L 21723.1 20711.9 
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R3a 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 36307 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
Marginal 
effect 
Y=average 
Average 
marginal 
effect 
        
Intercept -1.7798 0.0277 4139.5 <.0001    
Flag trading (changes>1) 1.6338 0.0260 3958.3 <.0001 5.123 0.3275 0.3205 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.2214 0.0352 39.6 <.0001 1.248 0.0443 0.0392 
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.1153 0.0294 15.3 <.0001 0.891 -0.0231 -0.0198 
Age cluster over 53 years 0.1941 0.0620 9.8 0.0017 1.214 0.0389 0.0347 
Income cluster from 2500 to 2900 0.2707 0.0376 51.9 <.0001 1.311 0.0542 0.0485 
Income cluster over 2900 euro 0.2118 0.0329 41.4 <.0001 1.236 0.0424 0.0376 
Flag geographic area South -0.2283 0.0338 45.8 <.0001 0.796 -0.0458 -0.0387 
Flag geographic area Island -0.2361 0.0382 38.2 <.0001 0.790 -0.0473 -0.0397 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.1764 0.0352 25.1 <.0001 1.193 0.0353 0.0312 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 71.1%  Somers’D 0.452 
Percentage of  tied pairs 3.0%  Gamma 0.466 
Percentage of discordant pairs 25.9%  Tau-a 0.181 
Number of pairs 264352012  c 0.726 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 3616.3 <.0001 
Score 3581.3 <.0001 
Wald 2975.7 <.0001 
 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 42893.4 38026.8 
SC 42901.9 38111.8 
-2 log L 42891.4 38006.8 
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Table 6 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R3b 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 36307 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
Marginal 
effect 
Y=average 
Average 
marginal 
effect 
Intercept -2.2436 0.0466 2322.4 <.0001    
Flag trading (changes>1) 1.1560 0.0294 1547.7 <.0001 3.177 0.2318 0.2138 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0169 0.0357 0.2254 0.635 0.983 -0.0034 -0.0027 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.2974 0.0361 67.8 <.0001 1.346  0.0596 0.0501 
Age cluster from 36 to 46 years        
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.1886 0.0306 37.9 <.0001 0.828 -0.0378 -0.0304 
Age cluster over 53 years -0.4998 0.0696 51.5 <.0001 0.607 -0.1002 -0.0744 
Income cluster less than 1900 euro -0.0280 0.0348 0.6 0.42 0.972 -0.0056 -0.0045 
Income cluster from 1900 to 2500        
Income cluster from 2500 to 2900 0.0190 0.0409 0.2 0.643 1.019 0.0038 0.00312 
Income cluster over 2900 euro -0.2500 0.0382 42.9 <.0001 0.779 -0.0501 -0.0395 
Net value 0.0001 3.141E-6 1263.6 <.0001 1.000 2.25E-5  
Flag geographic area Islands -0.3519 0.0433 65.9 <.0001 0.703 -0.0706 -0.0550 
Flag geographic area South -0.2242 0.0387 33.7 <.0001 0.799 -0.0449 -0.0358 
Flag geographic area Centre        
Flag geographic area North-West  0.0111  0.0377 0.1 0.769 1.011 0.0022 0.0018 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.1963 0.0398 24.3 <.0001 1.217 0.0394 0.0329 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 76.4%  Somers’D 0.533 
Percentage of  tied pairs 0.5%  Gamma 0.535 
Percentage of discordant pairs 23.1%  Tau-a 0.115 
Number of pairs 150075253  c 0.766 
   
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 6449.7 <.0001 
Score 6553.9 <.0001 
Wald 5212.8 <.0001 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 42893.4 36469.7 
SC 42901.9 36588.7 
-2 log L 42891.4 36441.7 
The parameters “Age cluster from 36 to 46 years”, “Income cluster from 1900 to 2500” and “Flag geographic 
area Centre” have been set to 0, since the categories are a linear combination of others. 
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Table 7 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R4a 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 15866 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
Marginal 
effect 
Y=average 
Average 
marginal 
effect 
        
Intercept 0.4451 0.0564 62.1750 <.0001    
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.2845 0.0432 43.2631 <.0001 1.329 0.0659 0.0664 
Age cluster from 36 to 46 years -0.1155 0.0486 5.6537 0.0174 0.891 -0.026 -0.0263 
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.3528 0.0512 47.5660 <.0001 0.703 -0.081 -0.0816 
Age cluster over 53 years -0.6420 0.0745 74.2646 <.0001 0.526 -0.148 -0.1539 
Income cluster from 2500 to 2900 0.1567 0.0484 10.4650 0.0012 1.170 0.0363 0.0351 
Income cluster over 2900 euro 0.1815 0.0437 17.2751 <.0001 1.199 0.0420 0.0407 
Flag geographic area South -0.1754 0.0439 15.9873 <.0001 0.839 -0.0406 -0.0406 
Flag geographic area North-West  0.1271 0.0456 7.7788 0.0053 1.136 0.0294 0.0287 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.2362 0.0485 23.7052 <.0001 1.266 0.0547 0.0527 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 55.6%  Somers’D 0.153 
Percentage of  tied pairs 4.1%  Gamma 0.160 
Percentage of discordant pairs 40.3%  Tau-a 0.071 
Number of pairs 58327173  c 0.577 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 245.8 <.0001 
Score 246.4 <.0001 
Wald 242.5 <.0001 
 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 20821.3 20593.4 
SC 20829.0 20670.2 
-2 log L 20819.301 20573.4 
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Table 8 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R4b 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 15866 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
Marginal 
effect 
Y=average 
Average 
marginal 
effect 
Intercept 0.2572 0.0592 18.9 <.0001    
Flag trading (changes>1) -0.3086 0.0415 55.2 <.0001 0.734 -0.0715 -0.0682 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.2488 0.0438 32.2 <.0001 1.283 0.0576 0.0571 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.1617 0.0501 10.4 0.0012 1.176 0.0374 0.0358 
Age cluster from 36 to 46 years        
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.2634 0.0392 45.2 <.0001 0.768 -0.0610 -0.0599 
Age cluster over 53 years -0.7492 0.0696 115.7 <.0001 0.473 -0.1735 -0.1773 
Income cluster less than 1900 euro -0.1064 0.0457 5.4 0.0198 0.899 -0.0246 -0.0241 
Income cluster from 1900 to 2500        
Income cluster from 2500 to 2900 0.0246 0.0513 0.2 0.6311 1.025 0.0057 0.0055 
Income cluster over 2900 euro -0.0615 0.0485 1.6 0.2045 0.940 -0.0142 -0.0138 
Net value 0.00004 3.128E-6 194.1 <.0001 1.000 1.02E-5  
Flag geographic area Islands -0.0654 0.0555 1.4 0.2381 0.937 -0.0404 -0.0147 
Flag geographic area South -0.1745 0.0482 13.1 0.0003 0.840 -0.0151 -0.0398 
Flag geographic area Centre        
Flag geographic area North-West  0.1089 0.0495 4.8 0.0279 1.115 0.02523 0.0242 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.2323 0.0523 19.7 <.0001 1.261 0.05382 0.0512 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 61.4%  Somers’D 0.234 
Percentage of  tied pairs 0.7%  Gamma 0.236 
Percentage of discordant pairs 37.9%  Tau-a 0.109 
Number of pairs 58327173  c 0.617 
   
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 462.2 <.0001 
Score 450.6 <.0001 
Wald 435.9 <.0001 
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 20821.3 20385.1 
SC 20829.0 20492.5 
-2 log L 20819.3 20357.1 
The parameters “Age cluster from 36 to 46 years”, “Income cluster from 1900 to 2500” 
and “Flag geographic area Centre” have been set to 0, since the categories are a linear 
combination of others. 
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Table 9 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R5a 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 6593 (from “Unico”) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -0.3203 0.1284 6.2 0.0126  
Flag trading (changes>1) -1.9032 0.0626 924.5 <.0001 0.149 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.7464 0.0787 90.0 <.0001 2.109 
Age cluster till 36 years 0.2204 0.0741 8.8 0.0029 1.247 
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.7148 0.0674 112.3 <.0001 0.489 
Age cluster over 53 years -2.8501 0.6127 21.6 <.0001 0.058 
Net value 0.0001 0.00002 25.1 <.0001 1.000 
Flag geographic area Islands -0.7432 0.0895 68.9 <.0001 0.476 
Flag geographic area South -0.7022 0.1037 45.9 <.0001 0.496 
Flag geographic area Centre -0.2097 0.0784 7.2 0.0075 0.811 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.3203 0.0867 13.7 0.0002 1.378 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 78.0%  Somers’D 0.562 
Percentage of  tied pairs 0.2%  Gamma 0.564 
Percentage of discordant pairs 21.8%  Tau-a 0.277 
Number of pairs 10712070  c 0.781 
   
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 1663.0 <.0001 
Score 1490.0 <.0001 
Wald 1228.1 <.0001 
   
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 9047.7 7404.6 
SC 9054.5 7479.4 
-2 log L 9045.7 7382.6 
The variable income has been left before the stepwise method 
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Table 10 
Dependent Variable : Y=1 if worker switches 
to higher risk category; Y=0 otherwise 
R5b 
Method: Logistic Regression 
Number of observations: 27034 (from “Unico”) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Prob. Odd 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -2.6092 0.0773 1138.6 <.0001  
Flag trading (changes>1) -0.4495 0.0524 73.5 <.0001 0.638 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.3905 0.0606 41.5 <.0001 1.478 
Age cluster from 36 years to 46 years -0.1719 0.0496 12.0 0.0005 0.842 
Age cluster from 46 years to 53 years -0.7296 0.0596 149.7 <.0001 0.482 
Age cluster over 53 years -2.2800 0.5831 15.3 <.0001 0.102 
Income cluster over 2900 euro 0.1478 0.0532 7.7 0.0055 1.159 
Flag geographic area Centre 0.5690 0.0568 100.4 <.0001 1.767 
Flag geographic area North-West 0.6807 0.0568 143.5 <.0001 1.975 
Flag geographic area North-East 0.9988 0.0588 288.6 <.0001 2.715 
 
Goodness of fit through probability association 
 
Percentage of concordant pairs 62.5%  Somers’D 0.289 
Percentage of  tied pairs 3.9%  Gamma 0.301 
Percentage of discordant pairs 33.6%  Tau-a 0.055 
Number of pairs 70052293  c 0.645 
   
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 677.8 <.0001 
Score 641.1 <.0001 
Wald 607.4 <.0001 
   
Model Fit Statistics Intercept only Intercept and 
Covariates 
AIC 18439.7 17779.9 
SC 18447.9 17862.0 
-2 log L 18437.7 17759.9 
 
 
56 
 
Table 11 
Test of hypothesis  A1 
 Male Female Differences 
in weights 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Total (34617) 21.19% 18.27% 2.92% 23.85 <0.0001 
If Income > 2500€ (15174) 21.85% 18.79% 3.06% 7.83 0.0052 
If Income> 2500€ & Age <37 years old (1592) 22.04% 17.19% 14.83% 3.29 0.0698 
In parenthesis the size of the sample subgroup  
 
Table 12 
Test of hypothesis B1 
 Male Female Differences 
in weights 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Total (14935) 50.28% 37.68% 12.60% 138.18 <0.0001 
If Income > 2500€ (5530) 49.44% 38.43% 11.01% 27.58 <0.0001 
If Income> 2500€ & Age <37 years old (480) 56.92% 45.36% 11.56% 4.17 0.0411 
In parenthesis the size of the sample subgroup  
 
Table 13 
Test of hypothesis B2 
 Male Female Differences 
in weights 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Total (14125) 50.89% 37.55% 13.34% 143.73 <0.0001 
If Income > 2500€ (5343) 49.97% 39.63% 10.34% 22.71 <0.0001 
If Income> 2500€ & Age <37 years old (400) 60.19% 51.85% 8.34% 1.85 0.1739 
In parenthesis the size of the sample subgroup  
 
Table 14 
Test of hypothesis C1 
 Inscription before 
01/01/2007 
Inscription after 
01/01/2007 
Differences in 
weights 
Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Total (14935) 48.59% 38.64% 9.95% 30.36 <0.0001 
If Income > 2500€ (5530) 48.81% 29.95% 18.86% 25.58 <0.0001 
If Income> 2500€ & Age <37 years old (480) 58.58% 35.00% 23.58% 14.85 0.0001 
In parenthesis the size of the sample subgroup 
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